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ROGER A. LANE*

Direct Creditor Claims for Breach of Fiduciary
Duty: Is they is, or is they ain't?'
A Practitioner'sNotes From the Field

INTRODUCTION
FOR THE PRACTITIONER, THE TOPIC OF CREDITORS' CLAIMS against corporate directors for an alleged breach of fiduciary duty is particularly vexing. There is a dearth
of relevant case law, and what case law does exist, by and large, is not the work of
the state courts with authority to articulate the corporate law in their jurisdictions,
but of the federal courts (generally, the bankruptcy courts), which are called upon
to render decisions with little, if any, authoritative state court guidance. This is not
a temporary phenomenon-it is endemic to the field. Creditor claims for breach of
fiduciary duty typically arise in federal bankruptcy cases, and for that reason, the
state courts rarely have an opportunity to address them, or at least to address them
directly. Thus, the lack of authoritative state court guidance is perpetuated.
When, as a practitioner, one represents plaintiffs in this context, the clients need
to understand that the viability of the claims they seek to advance may itself be
unsettled. The success of their claims, therefore, may not depend solely on the
development and presentation of the evidence. For defense counsel, and for corporate counsel who seek to advise directors and avoid litigation in the first instance,
the situation is no better, and possibly worse: it is relatively easy for professional
advisers to prepare and run through a board packet that informs directors of the
potential effect of their actions on creditors' interests. It may be difficult, however,
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1. The line is attributed to a 1964 letter from one Estelle Dumbrava to Major Maston Jacks, U.S. Air
Force, Project Bluebook. UFO Help, http://www.ufohelp.com (last visited Jan. 11, 2007). The full quatrain, of
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filled with fear. So tell me Major, ere I faint, is they is, or is they ain't?"
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to ensure that such an exercise in the duty of care, or any particular decision, will
protect directors from liability in all circumstances, or that a motion to dismiss
claims brought against them will succeed.
By the same token, the effort under way in some circles to stem the tide of
fiduciary-duty claims brought by creditors against corporate directors is, well, like
trying to stem the tide. Efforts can be made to channel these legal developments
through advocacy and scholarly commentary, but it is either too early or too late to
stop the trend altogether. The peculiar dialectical processes of the common law
have been trained on this issue and have not yet arrived at a solution set. The
doctrinal development, moreover, will be characterized by frequent periods of inactivity, when the economy is essentially healthy and claims of this type are not
asserted in any significant number. At some point, it may emerge that we have been
chasing a phantom: a string of cases converging more or less on the point that a
distinct body of fiduciary duties to creditors is not needed. But we are not there yet.
Given this unsettled backdrop, it is with some trepidation that one advances any
substantive thesis in the field, particularly a practitioner. Indeed, the discussion
that follows might best be regarded as a series of notes from the field, with all of the
roughness, incompleteness, and lack of systematic development that it implies,
rather than a fully considered conceptual apparatus. I will, nonetheless, offer two
thoughts for consideration.
The first is that when all the dust clears, I believe there will be a place for creditors to assert direct breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against corporate directors, although I think that will only occur in very limited circumstances. In fact, I believe
that the scope of such claims may not extend materially beyond (i) claims for selfdealing, where the challenged conduct results in injury to a particular creditor; (ii)
claims for interference with voting rights, in circumstances where secured lenders
accede to such rights; and possibly, (iii) claims for "bad faith" or intentional director misconduct, provided that the challenged conduct results in injury to a particular creditor. The description of these types of claims should suggest something of
their rarity; the theory will not, I believe, develop into the doctrinal equivalent of a
kudzu vine.
The second thought is that the doctrinal model for articulating these issues in a
more comprehensive fashion is most likely ,to be derived from the principles applied to preferred stock-a corporate security that, as long noted, can share significant characteristics with debt instruments. Most litigation involving fiduciary duty
to creditors will continue to occur, as it has for the past quarter century, in derivative actions in which the duties of corporate directors, although in flux with respect
to the primacy or weight to be given to creditors' interests, are nonetheless assessed
in a framework that is reasonably well understood. A construct for evaluating potential direct creditor claims for breach of fiduciary duty does not exist, however,
and reference to the treatment of direct preferred stockholder claims may therefore
be a useful starting point.
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BARRED BY THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT RULE AND

SECTION 102(B)(7) CHARTER PROVISIONS

Before commenting on what I consider to be the primary, or most difficult, issues
in this area, it may be helpful to identify and distinguish those issues I believe to be
secondary. This is not to say that these other issues are unimportant, free from
doubt, or unworthy of considerable thought. On the contrary, it is a compliment to
them that they are simply not as muddled as the issues on which I would like to
focus.
First, I agree with other commentators that the question of whether directors
may owe fiduciary duties to creditors in the "zone" or "vicinity" of insolvency, or

only when the firm is "insolvent in fact," is of secondary importance analytically.2
Make no mistake, the question of when such duties arise (i.e., which financial condition of the firm will trigger such duties) can be of great practical value. If a
creditor can, by asserting a "zone" claim, materially expand the period during
which it was owed fiduciary duties, that creditor can usually enhance the damages
it claims (and hence its potential recovery) significantly. There is no mystery as to
why creditors find the theory so irresistible. Nonetheless, it seems to me a more
fundamental matter to determine first what these fiduciary duties might be and
then to debate when they might arise. My suspicion is that no "when" line can be
drawn that is not in some sense arbitrary or that is free of all ambiguity in application. As a practitioner-if forced to choose-I would always prefer to have a grip
on what standards may be applied to judge my clients' conduct and to give them
the benefit of that knowledge when they make material corporate decisions.3
Second, I believe that issues relating to creditors' pursuit of derivative claims on
behalf of the corporation are less troublesome, from an analytic perspective, than
the subject of direct creditor claims. Here again, the subject of creditors pursuing
derivative claims is of substantial practical importance, and this should not be
overlooked. In fact, the overwhelming majority of instances in which creditors sue
and recover from corporate directors (or, more commonly, from the directors' liability insurance carrier) are, and will continue to be, cases involving derivative
claims. In addition, at the substantive level, the cases themselves confront many of
the hard issues in this area. It is in these cases that the debate over the existence and
scope of directors' fiduciary duty to creditors is most commonly litigated-to
2. See, e.g., J. William Callison, Why a Fiduciary Duty Shift to Creditors of Insolvent Business Entities is
Incorrect as a Matter of Theory and Practice, 1 J.Bus. &TECH. L. 431 (2007).
3. The "when" and "what" questions are, of course, not completely independent of one another. Indeed,
some commentators fairly ask whether, if fiduciary duties to creditors exist in the "vicinity" of insolvency,
different levels of attention or deference to creditor interests may be required as one moves from the "vicinity"
of insolvency to insolvency in fact, potentially compounding the practical difficulties that directors face in this
setting. See id.
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whom or what is the duty owed, and how is the duty to be articulated relative to
stockholder interests or the broader interests of the corporate enterprise.4 In addition, the "direct/derivative" distinction itself can be counted on to generate a few
bona fide head-scratchers from time to time, Tooley v. Donaldson, Lufkin & Jenrette,
Inc.' notwithstanding.
Nonetheless, this subject is less fundamental in my mind for three reasons. First,
the practice of granting creditors "derivative standing" to pursue breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims against directors, when the corporation itself and its stockholders
fail to do so, is well established as a practical matter, at least in the bankruptcy
context, where it most frequently arises.6 Second, granting a creditor or creditor
group standing to pursue a claim that the corporation or its stockholders could
otherwise pursue does not, in and of itself, give rise to new or different liability
risks for the directors, nor does it change the ex ante advice that should be provided
to the directors to guide their conduct; it merely allows a different party to proceed
with the claim.' Third, whatever its flaws may be, the notion of granting creditors
derivative standing to seek redress for harm to the corporation certainly enjoys
more comfortable conceptual footing than its cousin, the direct creditor claim.
Finally, I believe there is less analytic interest in claims barred by the business
judgment rule or exculpatory charter provisions, such as those adopted under authority of section 102(b)(7) of the Delaware General Corporation Law (DGCL).'
Generally, with regards to the business judgment rule, these include claims that
seek to challenge directors' business decisions (or "actions") but fall short of alleging, with specific facts, that the directors were subject to a disabling conflict of
interest or that they acted in bad faith, failed to exercise due care, or made irrational decisions.9 With regards to claims challenging director inaction (other than a
conscious decision not to act), the business judgment rule bars the claim unless the
plaintiff alleges facts sufficient to show that the directors were grossly negligent, or
at least negligent, in failing to act." Finally, in the case of a section 102(b)(7) char-

4. See, e.g., In re Ben Franklin Retail Stores, Inc., 225 B.R. 646, 652-56 (Bankr. N.D. 111.1998).
5. 845 A.2d 1031 (Del. 2004).
6. See Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Cybergenics Corp. ex rel. Cybergenics Corp. v. Chinery,
330 F.3d 548, 553 (3d Cir. 2003).
7. The most critical issue, in other words, is not who has standing, but what the fiduciary duty to creditors is in the first place.
8. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2004).
9. See, e.g., Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 634 A.2d 345, 361 (Del. 1993), modified, 636 A.2d 956 (Del.
1994); Citron v. Fairchild Camera & Instrument Corp., 569 A.2d 53, 64 (Del. 1989). Language in Aronson v.
Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244 (Del. 2000), suggests that the
business judgment rule standard is "predicated upon concepts of gross negligence," although the interpretation
of that comment is subject to dispute.
10. The doctrine here, although gravitating toward the gross negligence standard, remains a bit unsettled.
See, e.g., Seminaris v. Landa, 662 A.2d 1350, 1355 (Del. Ch. 1995) (gross negligence standard); In re Baxter Int'l,
Inc. S'holders Litig., 654 A.2d 1268, 1270-71 (Del. Ch. 1995) (implied gross negligence standard). Cf Rabkin v.
Philip A. Hunt Chem. Corp., No. Civ.A. 7547, 1987 WL 28436, at *3 (Del. Ch. Dec. 17, 1987) (negligence
standard).
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ter provision, the recovery of damages from directors is barred with respect to
direct stockholder and derivative "due care" claims that survive the business judgment rule, but do not rise to the level of bad faith or intentional misconduct."
Assuming that the business judgment rule continues to exist, that no corporation
would intentionally fail to include a section 102(b)(7) provision in its charter, that
the majority of creditor "due care" claims continue to be derivative, and that section 102(b)(7) provisions will remain relatively easy to prove and enforce (the
strange saga of Emerald Partnersv. Berlin 2 notwithstanding), it seems to me of less
importance to ask whether creditors might assert such claims.
II.

APPROACHING THE "HARD ISSUES"; WHAT HAS
PASSED THROUGH THE FILTERS?

After applying the various screens and filters referenced above, what potential direct creditor claims exist? The candidates are basically of two types: (i) direct claims
for injunctive or other equitable relief, 3 and (ii) limited categories of direct claims
for damages.
Close scrutiny of what remains reveals that further sorting is required, however,
if specific candidates for direct creditor claims are to be isolated for review. In the
rubric of section 102(b)(7), the categories of damages claims that survive are potentially four in number: (i) claims for breach of the duty of loyalty, including
transactions from which a director derived an "improper personal benefit"; 4 (ii)
claims for acts or omissions that were not in good faith, or that involved intentional
misconduct or a knowing violation of law; (iii) claims under DGCL section 174 for
unlawful dividend payment, stock purchase, or redemption; 5 and possibly (iv) direct creditor claims for breach of the duty of care. Except for the third category,
however, each of these covers a broad array of potential claims.
In addition, the range of potential direct claims for injunctive or other equitable
relief remains vast-nearly as broad as the equitable jurisdiction of the Delaware
11. An interesting question is whether a creditor can or should be able to assert a direct claim for a breach
of the fiduciary duty of care that falls short of the section 102(b)(7) standard of "bad faith." DEL. CODE ANN.
tit.
8, § 102(b)(7) (2004). Technically, section 102(b)(7) authorizes exculpation of directors only for liability"to
the corporation or its stockholders." Id. (emphasis added). Thus, a section 102(b)(7) charter provision may not
by its terms bar a direct creditor claim for the recovery of damages for an ordinary breach of the duty of care.
This is an anomaly. Is it possible that disinterested directors of an insolvent firm, or a firm in the "zone," could
act in a grossly negligent or reckless fashion (and hence breach the duty of care), and do so in a way that does
not harm the corporation generally (that would be a derivative claim), but does harm one or more creditors
specially? I believe it can be said with some confidence that the drafters of section 102(b)(7) did not draft the
provision to preserve this issue, as the entire focus at that time was upon blunting the fallout from Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985), which did not involve creditor claims. Nonetheless, the issue exists, although it may be more theoretical than real.
12. 726 A.2d 1215 (Del. 1999).
13. Only claims for damages are barred by a section 102(b)(7) charter provision. DEL. COnE ANN. tit. 8,
§ 102(b)(7) (2004) (referring to "monetary damages").
14. id.
15. Id. § 174.
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Court of Chancery or courts of chancery or general jurisdiction in other states as to
matters of corporate law. These include claims regarding voting rights, actions to
compel annual meetings, election contests, requests for corporate books and
records, corporate disclosure disputes, challenges to defensive mechanisms (poison
pills, white knights, defensive charter or bylaw amendments, and the like), and
challenges to mergers and acquisitions (the Revlon/QVC 6 duty and related doctrines), to name a few.
III.

ANNOUNCING

THE CANDIDATES: FOUR CATEGORIES OF

POTENTIAL DIRECT CREDITOR CLAIMS

After the preceding winnowing and sorting, and as a first approximation, four categories of potential direct creditor claims initially stand out, at least in my mind: (1)
stockholder favoritism claims; (2) inter-creditor favoritism coupled with self-dealing claims; (3) inter-creditor favoritism, without self-dealing claims; and (4) voting
rights and related doctrines.
With regard to the first category, stockholder favoritism claims, I believe I travel
with the herd in suspecting that creditors already have adequate, express remedies
against wayward directors, including most notably under DGCL section 174,"7 independent of any remedies that may exist against the corporation by statute or
contract. Accordingly, although further work would be required to verify that creditors are in fact fully protected against director misconduct in this area, I will not
devote further attention to this category here. What is worth noting is the obvious-although section 174 is a rare instance in which the DGCL provides a remedy
for creditors directly against the directors of a troubled corporation for negligent or
willful misconduct, it does demonstrate that the concept is not entirely alien to, or
wholly at odds with, the DGCL.
The second category is more interesting. Delaware law appears already to provide
for a direct creditor claim for inter-creditor favoritism that is coupled with selfdealing, at least where the corporation is insolvent. This includes situations in
which the corporation favors a creditor who is a director and situations in which a
favored creditor entity is affiliated with a director. Two cases from the early 1930s
indicate that a direct creditor claim will exist in such circumstances. 8 In this category of cases, one might say generally that the insolvent corporation has a faithless
fiduciary, coupled with a "supine" board, 9 and that the fiduciary's self-dealing has
16. See Paramount Commc'ns Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 43 (Del. 1994); Revlon, Inc. v.
MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 185 (Del. 1986).
17.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 174 (2004).
18. Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting Annuities v. S. Broad St. Theatre Co., 174 A. 112, 116 (Del. Ch.
1934) (so holding); Asmussen v. Quaker City Corp., 156 A. 180, 181 (Del. Ch. 1931) (dicta).
19. Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261, 1280 (Del. 1989) (finding board "torpid, if
not supine, in its efforts to establish a truly independent auction"). See Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & Granting
Annuities, 174 A. at 115 ("I cannot escape the conclusion that in so far at least as the interests of the Realty
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worked to the disadvantage of one or more creditors. Is the unstated rationale of
these cases that duty of loyalty issues are of such a nature that the courts will grant
an aggrieved and, therefore, properly motivated creditor a direct claim that would
ordinarily belong to the insolvent corporation itself or its stockholders? Language
in Pennsylvania Co. for Insurances on Lives & GrantingAnnuities v. South Broad St.
Theatre Co., although ambiguous, suggests such a rationale:
Let the theory under the rule be phrased as it may, analysis in the end will
resolve all the reasons underlying the rule into the one simple proposition that
it is, as stated by Judge Kenyon in Stuart v. Larson, but "merely applied common honesty" that a director of an insolvent corporationshould not be allowed
as it sinks to take advantage of his position by rushing ahead to a place in the
0
life boat, if I may use the figure, ahead of his fellow passengers."
One puzzle is that the case, proceeding on the "trust fund" theory, grants relief
akin to what might be obtained in a derivative action (i.e., a constructive trust over
the funds in the hands of the favored insider-creditor, for the benefit of all creditors).2" Nowhere does the court consider, however, whether the claim might more
properly have been considered derivative. Was this feature of the decision intentional, or was the issue simply not brought to the court's attention? Nothing on the
face of the decision addresses the issue, and therefore it is fair to ask whether a
direct claim would be permitted on similar facts today, in light of subsequent Delaware decisions that more clearly distinguish direct from derivative claims. I believe
that is unlikely-a creditor seeking to advance a duty-of-loyalty claim on a direct
basis today would be required to demonstrate an injury independent of injury to
the corporation or creditors generally, and it can fairly be anticipated that cases in
which that showing can be made will be relatively rare.
Skipping ahead, category four is also intriguing. Many credit agreements include
a stock pledge-often the stock of the borrower's subsidiaries, pledged as collateral-coupled with a grant of voting rights and an irrevocable proxy, exercisable
upon specified uncured events of default. If a creditor lawfully gains corporate
voting rights, should the creditor not also have the benefit and protection of those
fiduciary-duty doctrines that the Delaware courts have found necessary to extend
to stockholders, in order to protect the statutory franchise? For example, what if
the directors refuse to acknowledge an act of the party holding sole or majority
voting power (e.g., replacing the board through consent)? Or where the directors
seek to subvert the franchise?22 One often-forgotten fact is that the famous Credit
Corporation [the director-affiliated creditor] were concerned, the directors of the Theatre Company [the
debtor], if they were not subservient to, were at least responsive to, [the interested director's] wishes").
20. Pa. Co. for Ins. on Lives & GrantingAnnuities, 174 A. at 116 (citation omitted).
21. Id.at 117.
22. See Blasius Indus., Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. Ch. 1988).
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Lyonnais2 case began as an action under section 225 of the DGCL,24 in which the
secured lender sought a judicial determination that it had validly elected a new
board of directors for MGM after exercising its rights under a voting trust agreement.25 In that case, the bank was apparently deemed entitled to bring a section 225
action as "the legal (registered) owner" of the stock "at least for purposes of voting
it." 26 If permitted to invoke the statutory remedy qua stockholder, could the bank
not also invoke common-law fiduciary duty claims on the same basis?
This brings us to category three-the direct creditor claim for inter-creditor favoritism without self-dealing. In this category, unlike categories two and four, there
seem to be no collateral considerations that provide a means of avoiding confrontation with the core issue. There is no duty-of-loyalty issue, and hence the notion of
creditors functioning as advance guards against faithless fiduciaries, or perhaps rear
guards, has no traction. In addition, in no sense has the creditor stepped directly
into the stockholders' shoes, as with stock voting rights. Is there even such a category of claims? In discussing such a situation in ProductionResources, the Delaware
Court of Chancery recently said: "[TIhere might, possibly exist circumstances in
which the directors display such a marked degree of animus towards a particular
creditor with a proven entitlement to payment that they expose themselves to a
direct fiduciary duty claim by that creditor."
To be plain, this is a highly unsettled area. There is ample doubt about whether
direct creditor claims should even exist, and this is where I believe the most difficult issues lie. First, the room available for a creditor to assert a direct, as opposed
to a derivative, claim is exceedingly small. In the absence of self-dealing, the claim
would have to be one for lack of due care, for bad faith, or for intentional misconduct. In the vast run of cases, any harm to a particular creditor associated with such
claims is likely to have been associated with injury to the corporation as well, giving
rise to a derivative claim. In the words of the Production Resources court, one must
suppose a situation in which
the directors of an insolvent firm do not undertake conduct that lowers the
value of the firm overall, or of creditors in general, but instead take action that
frustrates the ability of a particular creditor to recover, to the benefit of the
remainder of the corporation'screditors and of its employees.2"

23. See Credit Lyonnais Bank Nederland, N.V. v. Pathe Commc'ns Corp., No. Civ.A. 12150, 1991 WL
277613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
24.

DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 225 (2005).

25.

Credit Lyonnais, 1991 WL 277613, at *1.

26.
27.

Id.
Prod. Res. Group, L.L.C. v. NCT Group, Inc., 863 A.2d 772, 798 (Del. Ch. 2004) (footnote omitted).

28.

Id. at 797.
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In Production Resources, the key allegation in this regard appeared to be that
"capital infusions have often been put into the coffers of [the debtor's] subsidiaries
precisely to frustrate the ability of [the plaintiff-creditor] to collect on debts due it
from [the debtor]."29 Yet even with this allegation, the Court of Chancery did not
squarely hold that a direct creditor claim had been stated, but only that it was "not
prepared to rule out the possibility that [the plaintiff creditor] can prove that the
[debtor's] board has engaged in conduct towards [the creditor] that might support a
direct claim for breach of fiduciary duty by it as a particular creditor."3
Furthermore, even if a creditor is able to make factual allegations that comport
with the guidance provided in Production Resources, it does not necessarily follow
that the courts would recognize the need for a fiduciary duty cause of action (i.e., a
cause of action in equity). The ProductionResources court went on in its discussion
to state:
In general, equity is reluctant to create remedies when adequate legal remedies
already exist. It may well be, for example, that upon close examination, existing principles of tort or contract law are sufficient when applied with the
understanding that directors bear a fiduciary relation to creditors when a firm
is insolvent.3'
Thus, part of the project-at least as envisioned in Production Resources-is to
review those existing remedies in detail and then to ask whether there is any need
for additional claims that creditors may pursue specifically against corporate directors. In this regard, there may be some high-level convergence between this project,
as framed by the doctrinal analysis, and the recent work of certain scholars that
suggests director and manager opportunism may be the key issue that requires
attention in this area, and not, as previously assumed and likely exaggerated, the
divergence between the interests of "gambling" stockholders and "Nervous Nelly"
creditors.32
The difficulties I have with the ProductionResources project are twofold. First, the
thought of having to rifle through all potentially applicable tort and contract theories and, in each case, to consider how each would be applied with the understanding that the parties are in a fiduciary relationship is daunting, to put it mildly.
That, in and of itself, is not a substantive objection, of course. In addition, something like the first part of the project-canvassing existing remedies to assess
whether an adequate remedy at law already exists against wayward corporate direc-

29. Id. at 781.
30. Id. at 800 (emphasis added).
31. Id. at 801 (citation omitted) (footnote omitted).
32. See, e.g., Stephen M. Bainbridge, Much Ado About Little? Directors' FiduciaryDuties in the Vicinity of
Insolvency, 1 J. Bus. &TECH. L. 335 (2007); Simone M. Sepe, Directors'Duty to Creditors and the Debt Contract,
1 J. Bus. & TECH. L. 553 (2007).
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tors-is surely necessary. It is with the second part of the project-considering
how these doctrines are to be applied in light of the parties' fiduciary relationship
(i.e., how the doctrines might be interpreted or applied differently in this special
circumstance)-with which I have difficulty.
This second aspect of the Production Resources project is not, to my knowledge,
an exercise we have engaged in elsewhere. To the contrary, part of the point of
having a separate body of fiduciary law is that it stands on its own and is not a kind
of catalytic agent for producing hybrid contract and tort doctrines for special use.
Indeed, our classic contract and tort doctrines were built on the premise that they
were to govern nonfiduciary relationships. It seems to me that we risk a bigger
muddle if we attempt to develop a body of "modified" tort and contract principles
to be applied when creditors sue corporate directors, as opposed to simply examining the body of fiduciary law we already have, and determining how it might be
interpreted and applied in this particular setting.
The suggestion is, instead of engaging in the second part of the Production Resources project, we turn to a preexisting body of comparable fiduciary-duty principles and apply them to. the problem of direct creditor fiduciary-duty claims. If, as
appears to be the case, we are required to accept that corporate directors owe fiduciary duties to creditors-at least once the firm is insolvent in fact-then the most
comparable existing model to use in analyzing and evaluating those duties is the
model that we apply to claims by preferred stockholders.
In point of fact, it is remarkable how much general similarity there is between
the courts' treatment of preferred stockholder rights and the contractual rights of
bondholders and other creditors. To be sure, preferred stock enjoys with the common, and has equal means to enforce, the protection of the core fiduciary duties of
care, loyalty, and good faith. Beyond that, however, any special rights of the preferred stockholder-liquidation preferences, antidilution and participation, director nomination, conversion, and so on-are interpreted like any other contractual
right.33 In particular, such rights are not implied but must be stated expressly, and
they are not subject to expansion or modification by a vague application of fiduciary principles. 4 As the Delaware Court of Chancery stated in Benchmark Capital,
[A court'sfunction in ascertainingthe rights of preferred stockholders] is essentially one of contract interpretation against the backdrop of Delaware precedent. These precedentialparameters are simply stated: Any rights, preferences
33. See, e.g., Elliot Assocs., L.P. v. Avatex Corp., 715 A.2d 843, 852-53 (Del. 1998); Benchmark Capital
Partners IV, L.P. v. Vague, No. Civ.A. 19719, 2002 WL 1732423, at *6 (Del. Ch. July 15, 2002), affd sub nor;
Benchmark Capital Partners IV, L.P. v. Juniper Fin. Corp., 822 A.2d 396 (Del. 2003); Superwire.com, Inc. v.
Hampton, 805 A.2d 904, 910 (Del. Ch. 2002); Sanders v. Devine, No. CIV. A. 14679, 1997 WL 599539, at *5
(Del. Ch. Sept. 24, 1997).
34. Benchmark Capital, 2002 WL 1732423, at *6; Hampton, 805 A.2d at 910. In this respect, the model
appears to be somewhat akin to what Sepe has in mind when he refers to "[a] default duty of directors to
.
creditors, paired to a regime of textualist interpretation of the debt contract .... See Sepe, supra note 32, at
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and limitations of preferred stock that distinguish that stock from common
stock must be expressly and clearly stated, as provided by statute. Therefore,
these rights, preferences and liquidations will not be presumed or implied.3"
Similarly, in Sanders, the Court of Chancery stated:
The rights of preferred stockholders, to the extent they are provided in [the]
certificate [of designations], are primarily contractual in nature, thus, the
scope of the duties owed are measured by reference to the specific provisions of
the certificateof designations, ratherthan any generalfiduciary standard. The
Court'sfunction in this context is merely to construe the contract by employing
36
the well established methods of contract interpretation.
In addition, the courts' application of the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing to the terms of preferred stock and debt instruments is nearly identical.37 In
Sanders, for example, the Court of Chancery dismissed an implied covenant claim
that paralleled the preferred stockholder's defective fiduciary duty claim, stating,
"[flor the same reason that the express contractual terms of the Shares define the
scope of the defendants' fiduciary duties in connection with the cash-out, those
terms preclude the implication of a more generalized duty of 'good faith and fair
dealing' to require behavior inconsistent with them."3
On this model, a fiduciary duty claim advanced by a creditor-like a preferred
stockholder's fiduciary duty claim-would have to pass through all of the familiar
tests applicable to such claims: demand and pleading requirements for derivative
claims and an injury apart from injury to the corporation or creditors generally for
direct claims; the business judgment rule and, at least with respect to derivative
claims, any section 102(b)(7) charter provision; materiality standards and other
tests for director interest and independence where loyalty claims are asserted; and
so on.
For clarity, I do not say that the principles applicable to preferred stock can and
should be applied without modification to creditors' fiduciary duty claims, but
only that the preferred stock model is the most comparable doctrinal model to use
as a tool and a starting point in analyzing and evaluating such claims. Among the
particular issues that would have to be confronted, for example, is how director
"interest" is to be defined in light of the fact that directors and their affiliates will
generally be holders of corporate equities (or rights to acquire equities) and not
debt instruments. The courts in Delaware, however, have already begun to develop

35. Benchmark Capital, 2002 WL 1732423, at *6 (citing Elliot Assocs., 715 A.2d at 852-53).
36. Sanders, 1997 WL 599539, at *5 (citations omitted).
37. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. RJR Nabisco, Inc., 716 F. Supp. 1504, 1517 (S.D.N.Y. 1989); Katz v.
Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 880 (Del. Ch. 1986).
38. Sanders, 1997 WL 599539, at *6 (citation omitted).
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a jurisprudence to address similar issues that arise when the interests of different
classes or series of stock conflict, including the preferred stock cases39 and the tracking-stock cases.4" Similarly, consideration would have to be given to whether certain
offshoots of the core fiduciary duties, such as the Caremarkduty of oversight,4 the
duty of candor," and the Revlon/QVC duty (which is explicitly phrased in terms of
stockholder value),43 can or should have any application to creditors, and, conversely, whether creditors who accede to substantial stock voting positions might
themselves owe fiduciary duties to the corporation after the pattern of majority or
controlling stockholders."
At the same time, certain collateral advantages of employing this model, at least
as a starting point, are apparent. For one, the model offers a platform for accommodating the fact that the providers of capital to modern corporations-senior
and subordinated secured lenders; unsecured noteholders, both convertible and
nonconvertible; general unsecured creditors; voting and nonvoting preferred stockholders; common stockholders; and so on-are more credibly described as existing
along a continuum, and not in a quasi-Cartesian dualism of "equity" and "debt."
Current models have difficulty embracing this reality.
In addition, the basic structure of the model is itself a kind of a bulwark against
wayward doctrinal excursions. The model starts with a core conception of basic
duties of loyalty, care, and good faith that apply to directors in all circumstances
and is generally characterized by an overarching duty to seek to maximize longterm firm value.45 In addition, the model exists within a system that is processoriented and, through the business judgment rule, affords substantial deference to
the substantive business decisions made by corporate directors.46 In particular, the
model recognizes that directors will be required to make tradeoffs among various
corporate constituencies and generally respects those decisions, provided they are
not irrational, a product of a flawed process, or tainted by self-interest or other
improper motives.47
These structural features, in my view, help to insulate the model from being
hijacked by a particular stakeholder or stakeholder constituency, or from generat-

39. See, e.g., Elliott Assocs., 715 A.2d at 852-53; Benchmark Capital, 2002 WIL 1732423, at *6; Hampton, 85
A.2d at 910; Sanders, 1997 WL 599539, at *5.
40. See, e.g., Solomon v. Armstrong, 747 A.2d 1098, 1105 (Del. Ch. 1999), affd, 746 A.2d 277 (Del. 2000);
In re Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d 611, 613 (Del. Ch. 1999).
41. In re Caremark Int'l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 971-72 (Del. Ch. 1996).
42. See, e.g., Malone v. Brincat, 722 A.2d 5, 11 (Del. 1998).
43. QVC Network, 637 A.2d at 43; Revlon, 506 A.2d at 185.
44. See, e.g., Kahn v. Lynch Commc'n Sys., Inc., 638 A.2d 1110, 1114 (Del. 1994) (noting that a director
told board members that, "[ylou must listen to us. We are 43 percent owner. You have to do what we tell you"),
ajJ'd, 669 A.2d 79 (Del. 1995).
45. See Katz v. Oak Indus. Inc., 508 A.2d 873, 879 (Del. Ch. 1986).
46. See Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 811- 12 (Del. 1984), overruled by Brehm v. Eisner, 746 A.2d 244
(Del. 2000).
47. See, e.g., In re Gen. Motors Class H S'holders Litig., 734 A.2d at 618-19.
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ing rules of conduct (and risks of liability) that are inconsistent with the fundamental premises of the model. In contrast, the Production Resources project of
reviewing existing tort and contract doctrines with an eye toward special application of those doctrines to the claims of creditors of insolvent firms invites the
claimant to go outside the model and develop theories for claims against corporate
directors that are not process-oriented, but instead tend toward micromanagement
and the curtailment of responsible decision-making discretion through the development and imposition of case and stakeholder-specific substantive rules.
Importantly, it remains to say exactly how best to articulate the directors' fiduciary duty once the company is insolvent and to decide whether that or a similar
duty applies in the zone of insolvency. It is generally clear that responsible directors
need to tread more carefully, and naturally would, if their corporation is financially
troubled or the directors are contemplating a "bet the company" strategic move.
What is not clear is whether the corporate law needs to dictate the primacy of any
one stakeholder group or formulate specific decision-making rules or criteria in
this area.48
If, in any event, we are required to start with the doctrinal premise that at some
point, directors will owe fiduciary duties to creditors, it seems preferable to work
from a model that has already substantially evolved and has done so in consideration of the fact that preferred stock can have contractual rights that exceed the
rights of the common and partake of some of the qualities of debt. The alternative
path-to start essentially from scratch on a new project that is not in keeping with
the basic premises and structure of fiduciary duty law-is, to my mind, both less
efficient and more likely to go astray. In addition, it seems to me that pursuing this
project with particular reference to direct creditor claims, rather than derivative
claims, is most likely to impose rigor on the analysis. It is altogether too easy, in
discussing a derivative claim, to draw comfort from the fact that harm to the corporation is being redressed and to gloss over technical difficulties as a result. When
a creditor seeks to recover directly from a corporate director, and the creditor will
itself retain any winnings, one is more inclined, I think, to sit up and take notice.
IV.

PULLING THE PIECES TOGETHER

By way of recapitulation, what do we seem to have? First, we have a statute that
authorizes creditors to sue directors, and not merely the corporation, for certain
payouts to stockholders. Depending on one's point of view, the statute may be
considered either a kind of "ice-breaker" in the debate on direct creditor claims or
evidence that the legislature can and does provide for such remedies when, and to
the extent, it deems appropriate, and, as a result, supplementation from the courts
(at least in the form of additional fiduciary duty doctrine) is unnecessary.
48. See, e.g., Richard A. Booth, Stockholders, Stakeholders, and Bagholders (or How Investor Diversification
Affects Fiduciary Duty), 53 Bus. LAW. 429, 430-38 (1998).
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Second, we have a pair of decisions from the 1930s that suggest that a creditor
may bring a direct claim against the director of an insolvent corporation when the
director is alleged to have engaged in self-dealing and favored himself (or his affiliated corporation) as a creditor of the insolvent corporation. Whether those cases
can be used today to support the assertion of a direct claim is an open question. If
the claim meets the modern Tooley49 test for direct claims, however, the cases likely
remain valid authority for the proposition that on such facts, a creditor can assert a
duty-of-loyalty claim against a corporate director.
Third, a more recent decision suggests, in a decidedly more tentative fashion,
that a creditor might be able to pursue a fiduciary duty claim against the directors
of an insolvent corporation when the directors are alleged to have engaged in intentional, bad-faith conduct toward the creditor.' To my knowledge, no case addresses
whether a creditor can assert a direct claim for damages for an ordinary breach of
the duty of care, and it is difficult to conceive of such a claim not being derivative."1
Among each of the types of claims examined here, this grouping is most in need of
a more comprehensive or systematic doctrinal assessment, and the suggestion is to
use the principles applicable to direct claims by preferred stockholders as a model
and tool for analysis.
Finally, we have the observation that when a creditor accedes to stock voting
rights, the creditor might also accede to the fiduciary-duty claims that normally
belong to stockholders to protect the franchise. As relevant to this category, we
have a reasonably recent case, Credit Lyonnais, that allowed a creditor, acting qua
stockholder under a voting trust agreement, to bring a statutory action to settle a
contested election. 2 This category of potential claims would appear to arise independent of the corporation's insolvency, because voting rights are typically acquired by creditors as a result of uncured loan defaults. Needless to say, as a
practical matter the two may go hand-in-hand in many, if not most, cases.
V.

CONCLUSION

In sum, the universe of potential direct creditor claims for breach of fiduciary duty
appears to be very limited, and most creditor claims are litigated in the context of
49. 845 A.2d 1031, 1031 (Del. 2004).
50. It is perhaps worth noting that the "bad faith" claim in Production Resources is distinct from the "bad
faith" claims that have recently drawn much attention in the Disney and Integrated Health cases. See Official
Comm. of Unsecured Creditors of Integrated Health Servs., Inc. ex rel. Integrated Health Servs., Inc. v. Elkins,
No. Civ.A. 20228-NC, 2004 WL 1949290, at *I (Del. Ch. Aug. 24, 2004); In re The Walt Disney Co. Derivative
Litig., 825 A.2d 275, 288- 89 (Del. Ch. 2003). In the Disney and IntegratedHealth cases, the central issue, at risk
of oversimplification, was whether disinterested directors showed such a marked lack of attention to, or overdelegated responsibility for, significant corporate decisions that they should be held liable for breach of fiduciary duty. In Production Resources, in contrast, the claim was premised on allegations of active or overt director
misconduct. 863 A.2d 772, 799- 800 (Del. Ch. 2004). In the interests of full disclosure, the Author represented
certain of the defendants in the Integrated Health case.
51. See supra note 11.
52. No. Civ.A. 12150, 1991 WL 277613, at *1 (Del. Ch. Dec. 30, 1991).
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derivative actions. So long as directors, however, are held to owe fiduciary duties to
creditors (at least with respect to insolvent corporations), and so long as secured
creditors may acquire stock voting rights, direct creditor claims for breach of fiduciary duty will exist. A better model is needed, however, to analyze and assess the
bases of these potential claims, to determine by what standards the decisions of
directors of troubled companies will be judged, and to determine when such claims
can be stated as a matter of law. The doctrines that are already applied to the
fiduciary-duty claims of preferred stockholders provide the most comparable, and
potentially useful, model for this analysis.
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